Does corruption and the institutional characteristics of the contracting authorities affect the execution of healthcare infrastructures?

Marina Cavalieri, Calogero Guccio () and Ilde Rizzo

Journal of Public Procurement, 2018, vol. 18, issue 2, 148-164

Abstract: Purpose - This paper aims at contributing to the research on the role played by corruption in the health procurement by use non-parametric techniques to examine whether the efficient execution of Italian public contracts for healthcare infrastructures is affected by socio-economic variables (including the level of “environmental” corruption) in the area where the work is localised and by the institutional features of the contracting authority. Design/methodology/approach - A data envelopment analysis (DEA) is applied to a sample of 405 contracts during the period 2000-2005. Smoothed bootstrap techniques to calculate confidence intervals for the estimated efficiency parameters along with different non-parametric tests and kernel density estimates are used. Findings - Results show that “environmental” corruption negatively influences the performance of healthcare infrastructures. Furthermore, healthcare contracting authorities appear to be less efficient than other public bodies acting as procurers. Originality/value - The paper highlights the role of environmental corruption in the provision of healthcare infrastructures.

Keywords: Corruption; Contracting authorities; Healthcare infrastructure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:jopppp:jopp-06-2018-010

DOI: 10.1108/JOPP-06-2018-010

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