Incumbent policy, benefits provision, and the triggering and spread of revolutionary uprisings
Kjell Hausken () and
Mthuli Ncube ()
Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 2017, vol. 12, issue 1, 54-63
This article analyzes revolutionary uprisings, such as the Arab spring of 2011. Revolutions occur with an inherent probability dependent on a country’s characteristics. A country’s incumbent leader can decrease this probability by providing benefits to a population, e.g., public goods such as necessities of life, health care, safety, and education. We equate the probability of revolution with Granovetter’s equilibrium proportion of a population that joins a revolution. Decreased benefits provision increases the share of revolutionaries which, in turn, decreases the cost of revolt which helps resolve the free-rider problem implicit in revolting. The article quantifies how the incumbent chooses whether or not to provide benefits, and how many benefits to provide. We account for the unit cost of providing benefits and for the effects of the benefits provided, adjusted for whether the inherent revolution probability is low or high. Combining the modeling approaches, i.e., how revolutions spread and how the incumbent provides benefits, enriches our understanding of which factors affect revolutions and of how populations and their incumbent leaders interact. The model helps to understand the logic of revolutionary uprisings and how they can be curtailed.
Keywords: Revolution; incumbent; conflict; benefits provision; riot; collective behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Open access 24 months after original publication.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:epc:journl:v:12:y:2017:i:1:p:54-63
Access Statistics for this article
Economics of Peace and Security Journal is currently edited by Jurgen Brauer and J Paul Dunne
More articles in Economics of Peace and Security Journal from EPS Publishing Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jurgen Brauer, Editor, EPSJ ().