“On Rents of Fishing Grounds” Revisited

Manuel Pacheco Coelho

International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, 2011, vol. 1, issue 2, 74

Abstract: Since the 50s, the central idea in the Fisheries Economics is that, in conditions of free access and competition, the market will lead to market equilibrium solutions that imply the overexploitation of the resources. This fundamental result is due to Scott Gordon in his seminal article of 1954, “The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery”, in the Journal of Political Economy. But, in fact, another (more antique) article put the problem and suggested this approach to its understanding: In a short paper, in 1911 (exactly 100 years ago), the Danish economist Jens Warming, put this issue and made a very similar analysis for the fisheries sector. The purpose of this research is to make a reflection on that paper and highlight the explanation proposed for the common property problem and, also, to study the legacy of this interesting fisheries economist to the History of Political Economy.

Keywords: Common property; Rent dissipation; Fisheries; Jens Warming. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ers:ijfirm:v:1:y:2011:i:2:p:74

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