Hunting Rights and Conservation: The Portuguese Case

Manuel Pacheco Coelho

International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, 2011, vol. 1, issue 4, 164

Abstract: Hunting and game-preservation are interrelated. There are two fundamental traditions in the legislation on hunting property rights: the Romanic tradition and the Germanic one, with different consequences in terms of resources use and conservation. The Economic Theory of Common Resources has been applied to provide conclusions about the management and conservation of hunting resources. In this paper, we derive a model of hunting management, adapting the Gordon/Schaefer fisheries model. The conclusions of the model are confronted with Portuguese hunting regulation.

Keywords: “Tragedy of the Commons”; hunting; gamepreservation; res-nullius. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journalfirm.com/journal/21/download (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ers:ijfirm:v:1:y:2011:i:4:p:164

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management from International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marios Agiomavritis ().