Modelling Enforcement and Compliance in Fisheries: A Survey

Manuel Coelho, José António Filipe and Manuel Alberto M. Ferreira

International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, 2013, vol. 3, issue 2, 464

Abstract: Monitoring and enforcement considerations have been largely ignored in the study of fishery management. This paper discusses this issue with a formal model to show the impacts of costly, imperfect enforcement of law on the behaviour of fishing firms and fisheries management. Theoretical analysis combines a standard bio-economic model of fisheries (Gordon/Schaefer) with Becker’s theory of Crime and Punishment.

Keywords: Fisheries; Crime; Punishment; Enforcement; Becker’s Theory. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ers:ijfirm:v:3:y:2013:i:2:p:464

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