European Constitutional Political Economy: Enlargement and the Crisis of Institutional System

J. Andres Faina, Antonio Garcia-Lorenzo and Jesus Lopez-Rodriguez

European Research Studies Journal, 2002, vol. V, issue 3-4, 45-58

Abstract: The classical “integration process” has reached a critical point and constitutional limits, which make a qualitative change of importance in the system of community government indispensable. Our paper is based on an analysis of the constitutional choices of citizens and governments using a political-economic model, whose main conclusion centres on the need for breaking the central governments’ monopoly in the representation of national interests of the Union’s member states, both at a constitutional level (reform of treaties) and in the institutional balance (decision making).

Keywords: Integration Demand; Integration Supply; Collective Supranational Action (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ers:journl:v:v:y:2002:i:3-4:p:45-58

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