 Do Financial Investors Mitigate Agency Problems? Evidence from an Emerging MarketMaria Aluchna and Tomasz Kuszewski European Research Studies Journal, 2021, vol. XXIV, issue 2 - Part 1, 872-888 Abstract: Purpose: The paper aims to identify the monitoring effect by financial investors and their potential role to mitigate agency costs resulting from concentrated and dispersed ownership. Design/Methodology/Approach: Using the sample of 440 companies from the Warsaw Stock Exchange listed in 2010-2014, we examine whether financial investors may mitigate the agency problems of dispersed and concentrated ownership. Findings: We observe that ownership by financial investors is positively correlated with company value. Adding to the debate on the monitoring role of financial investors, we note that investments by control-oriented institutions and portfolio-oriented investors are correlated with higher Tobin’s Q. Practical implications: The results indicate the positive effect of the monitoring by financial investors, which can offset some limitations of insufficient investor protection in emerging markets. Originality: The study is based on a unique sample of companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, distinguishing between control-oriented and portfolio-oriented financial investors. Keywords: Concentrated ownership; free float; financial investors. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ers:journl:v:xxiv:y:2021:i:2-part1:p:872-888 Access Statistics for this article More articles in European Research Studies Journal from European Research Studies Journal |
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