A Syntactic Approach to Knowledge in Finite Games of Perfect Information

Wenzhang Zhang ()
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Wenzhang Zhang: School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China

Frontiers of Economics in China-Selected Publications from Chinese Universities, 2015, vol. 10, issue 3, 467-482

Abstract: In this paper I present a syntactic approach to modeling the interactive knowledge of rationality in finite games of perfect information. This approach allows for a more transparent interpretation. In particular, we have the intuitive picture of viewing knowledge as the input and decisions as the output of a player's deliberation. This distinction is blurred in the semantic state-space approach.

Keywords: knowledge; rationality; backward induction; games of perfect information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fec:journl:v:10:y:2015:i:3:p:467-482

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