A Closed Form Characterization of the Stationary Outcome in Multilateral Bargaining

Yi Jin and Jianbo Zhang ()
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Yi Jin: Department of Economics, Monash University, Caulfield East, VIC 3145, Australia
Jianbo Zhang: Department of Economics, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045, USA

Frontiers of Economics in China-Selected Publications from Chinese Universities, 2013, vol. 8, issue 2, 272-287

Abstract: In this paper we consider infinite horizon multilateral bargaining with alternate offers. We prove that there exists only one stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome and it corresponds to the unique invariantmeasure of a column stochastic matrix. We characterize this stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in a closed form, and also extend the approach to the multilateral bargaining with random moves.

Keywords: multilateral bargaining; heterogeneous discount factors; stationary SPE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fec:journl:v:8:y:2013:i:2:p:272-287

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