Efficiency and Acceptability of Climate Policies: Race Against the Lock-ins

Julie Rozenberg (), Adrien Vogt-Schilb and Stephane Hallegatte

Review of Environment, Energy and Economics - Re3, 2013

Abstract: Policymakers have good reasons to favor capital-based policies - such as CAFE standards or feebates programs - over a carbon price. A carbon price minimizes the discounted cost of a climate policy, but may result in existing capital being under-utilized or scrapped before its scheduled lifetime, hurt the workers that depend on it, and inflict an immediate income drop. Capital-based policies avoid these obstacles, but can reach a given climate target only if implemented early enough. Delaying mitigation policies may thus create a political-economy lock- in (easier-to-implement policies become unavailable) in addition to the economic lock-in (the target becomes more expensive).

Keywords: Intergenerational Equity; Sectoral Policies; Mothballing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L50 O44 Q52 Q54 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Efficiency and Acceptability of Climate Policies: Race Against the Lock-ins (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femre3:2013.11-03

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