Efficiency and Acceptability of Climate Policies: Race Against the Lock-ins

Julie Rozenberg (), Adrien Vogt-Schilb and Stephane Hallegatte

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Abstract: Policymakers have good reasons to prefer capital-based policies - such as CAFE standards or feebates programs - over a carbon price. A carbon price minimizes the discounted cost of a climate policy, but may result in existing capital being under-utilized or scrapped before its scheduled lifetime, hurt the workers that depend on it, and inflict an immediate income drop. Capital-based policies avoid these obstacles, but can reach a given climate target only if implemented early enough. Delaying mitigation policies may thus create a political-economy lock-in (easier-to-implement policies become unavailable) in addition to the economic lock-in (the target becomes more expensive).

Keywords: intergenerational equity; sectoral policies; mothballing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-res
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Published in Review of Environment, Energy and Economics, 2013, pp.2013.11.002. ⟨10.7711/feemre3.2013.11.002⟩

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Journal Article: Efficiency and Acceptability of Climate Policies: Race Against the Lock-ins (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00916861

DOI: 10.7711/feemre3.2013.11.002

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