The Information Effect of Monetary Policy: Self-Defeating or Optimal?
Wesley Janson and
Chengcheng Jia ()
Economic Commentary, 2020, vol. 2020, issue 15, 5
As the Federal Reserve has become more transparent about its decisions on the federal funds target rate, the general public has begun to regard the rate as not only a benchmark interest rate, but also as a signal about the state of the economy. However, the specific information considered by the public to be revealed is not clearly understood. We investigate this question and find that the information revealed by monetary policy decisions is regarding future output growth, not inflation, and that such an information effect is theoretically optimal and does not make interest-rate policies self-defeating.
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