Central bank independence

Owen Humpage

Economic Commentary, 1994, issue Apr

Abstract: A discussion of how higher levels of central bank independence are associated with lower and more stable rates of inflation and why central bank autonomy is critical in a world where most governments are unwilling to hold themselves publicly accountable for price stability.

Keywords: Federal Reserve System - Independence; Banks and banking, Central (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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