Mortgage-backed securities: how important is \\"skin in the game\\"?

Christopher James

FRBSF Economic Letter, 2010, issue dec13

Abstract: Financial reform legislation passed by Congress in 2010 requires mortgage originators to retain some loss exposure on the mortgages they securitize. Recent research compares the performance of mortgage-backed securities for different types of issues in which originators retain different degrees of loss exposure. The findings suggest that retention of even modest loss exposure by originators reduces moral hazard and is associated with significantly lower loss rates on these securities.

Keywords: Mortgage-backed securities; Moral hazard; Mortgage loans (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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