Removing Conflict of Interest for Agents of Homebuyers

Borys Grochulski and Zhu Wang

Richmond Fed Economic Brief, 2023, vol. 23, issue 34

Abstract: In real estate transactions, sellers' agents have weak incentives to market homes sufficiently long to secure top prices for their clients. Buyers' agents, however, face completely backward incentives: They get paid more when their clients pay more for their homes. We discuss an a la carte compensation model for buyers' agents that eliminates this conflict of interest.

Keywords: Real Estate; Sellers Agents; Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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