Pension Funds Disclosure: Does Managers’ Knowledge Matter?

Leticia Martins Medeiros, Clea Beatriz Macagnan, Bruno de Medeiros Teixeira and Cristiane Benetti ()
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Leticia Martins Medeiros: Faculty of Economic Sciences (FCE), Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), Av. João Pessoa and 52, Porto Alegre 90046-901, RS, Brazil
Clea Beatriz Macagnan: Postgraduate Program in Accounting Sciences (PPGCC), Federal University of Paraíba (UFPB), Campus I, Cidade Universitária, João Pessoa 58051-900, PB, Brazil
Bruno de Medeiros Teixeira: Center for Human and Social Sciences, University of Vale do Taquari (Univates), Av. Avelino Talini, 171, Lajeado 95914-014, RS, Brazil
Cristiane Benetti: Finance Department, ICN Business School, CEREFIGE, Université de Lorraine, 54000 Nancy, France

Administrative Sciences, 2025, vol. 15, issue 7, 1-26

Abstract: This study aimed to analyze whether formal managers’ qualifications explain the Brazilian pension funds’ disclosure level. It started from the assumption of information asymmetry between stakeholders. We also recognize that the problems related to asymmetry in companies participating in the capital market, commonly pointed out in the literature, would not behave in the same way in pension funds. Other factors explain the disclosure in these organizations, like the qualification of managers. We calculated the disclosure level for each of the 209 Brazilian pension funds that made up the sample. We analyzed the dates using multiple linear and logistic regression as a robustness test. The results indicated that the formal qualification of managers, characterized by master’s and or doctoral degrees, has a positive relationship with the level of disclosure of pension funds, indicating that the greater the formal qualification of the manager, the greater the level of disclosure. Thus, this study shows insights that the explanations about company disclosure given in the literature, especially its effect on market value, are not necessarily the same in pension funds, which are explained by other factors, such as the qualification of managers. The results can contribute to regulatory bodies to formulate new rules that favor the capability of managers, in addition to identifying the information demanded by stakeholders, allowing for an increase in the level of disclosure and a reduction in information asymmetry, as well as the improvement of governance practices.

Keywords: disclosure; pension funds; education; qualification; governance; information asymmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L M M0 M1 M10 M11 M12 M14 M15 M16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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