Unveiling Agricultural Shifts through Stakeholder Interactions and Strategic Dynamics in Green Rice Production

Yixuan Lu, Zhixian Sun, Jing Xu and Guanxin Yao ()
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Yixuan Lu: Agricultural College, Yangzhou University, Yangzhou 225009, China
Zhixian Sun: Business School, Yangzhou University, Yangzhou 225009, China
Jing Xu: Business School, Yangzhou University, Yangzhou 225009, China
Guanxin Yao: Business School, Yangzhou University, Yangzhou 225009, China

Agriculture, 2024, vol. 14, issue 5, 1-29

Abstract: This study explores the strategic interactions among the government, growers, and the public within the context of green rice production, employing an evolutionary game theory framework. Recognizing the intricate dynamics of agricultural sustainability, we construct a three-party evolutionary game model to investigate the strategic decision-making processes and stability conditions of each stakeholder. The model assesses how various strategies evolve under the influence of economic incentives, regulatory measures, and public engagement. Through analytical and numerical methods, including stability analysis and MATLAB 2020b simulations, we identify the Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) that signify sustainable practices in green rice production. The results reveal that as government incentives for green production increase and fines for non-green practices are enforced, the likelihood of growers adopting sustainable practices significantly rises. Furthermore, the strategic enhancement of economic incentives and reputational factors not only bolsters governmental regulatory commitment but also reduces the necessity for public supervision, demonstrating a systemic shift towards self-regulation and market-driven sustainability. The simulations demonstrate the system’s evolution towards a stable state where governmental regulation is fully enforced, growers adopt green production universally, and public supervision becomes redundant. The findings underscore the importance of designing policy interventions that harmonize economic and environmental objectives, suggesting that well-structured incentives and regulatory measures can catalyze the transition towards sustainable agricultural practices. Additionally, our study highlights the pivotal role of establishing effective incentive structures that ensure the economic benefits of green production outweigh the costs, facilitating an autonomous regulatory system. This study contributes to the understanding of how strategic interactions shaped by policy and market forces can foster agricultural sustainability.

Keywords: sustainability; agricultural practices; stakeholder strategies; incentives; evolutionary game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q1 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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