The Two-Stage Game Approach to Coalition Formation: Where We Stand and Ways to Go
Achim Hagen (),
Pierre von Mouche () and
Hans-Peter Weikard ()
Additional contact information
Pierre von Mouche: Section Economics, Wageningen University, 6708 PB Wageningen, The Netherlands
Games, 2020, vol. 11, issue 1, 1-31
Coalition formation is often analysed in an almost non-cooperative way, as a two-stage game that consists of a first stage comprising membership actions and a second stage with physical actions, such as the provision of a public good. We formalised this widely used approach for the case where actions are simultaneous in each stage. Herein, we give special attention to the case of a symmetric physical game. Various theoretical results, in particular, for cartel games, are provided. As they are crucial, recent results on the uniqueness of coalitional equilibria of Cournot-like physical games are reconsidered. Various concrete examples are included. Finally, we discuss research strategies to obtain results about equilibrium coalition structures with abstract physical games in terms of qualitative properties of their primitives.
Keywords: binary action game; cartel game; Cournot-like game; coalition formation; equilibrium coalition structure; potential game; symmetric game; two-stage game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:11:y:2020:i:1:p:3-:d:303936
Access Statistics for this article
Games is currently edited by Prof. Dr. Ulrich Berger
More articles in Games from MDPI, Open Access Journal
Bibliographic data for series maintained by XML Conversion Team ().