Match Stability with a Costly and Flexible Number of Positions

James Gilmore and David Porter ()
Additional contact information
James Gilmore: Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, CA 92866, USA
David Porter: Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, CA 92866, USA

Games, 2025, vol. 16, issue 3, 1-12

Abstract: One of the main goals of two-sided matching mechanisms is to pair two groups of agents in a stable manner. Stability means that no pair of agents has an incentive to deviate from their assigned match. The outcome of such a match can have significant consequences for the participants involved. Most existing research in this field assumes that the quotas of organizations are fixed and externally determined, which may not always be realistic. We introduce the concept of slot stability, which considers the possibility that organizations may want to adjust their quotas after the match process. To address this issue, we propose an algorithm that generates both stable and slot-stable matches by using flexible, endogenous quotas.

Keywords: matching; stability; quotas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/3/27/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/3/27/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:16:y:2025:i:3:p:27-:d:1660999

Access Statistics for this article

Games is currently edited by Ms. Susie Huang

More articles in Games from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().