(Un)Bounded Rationality in Decision Making and Game Theory – Back to Square One?

Werner Güth () and Hartmut Kliemt

Games, 2010, vol. 1, issue 1, 1-13

Abstract: Game and decision theory start from rather strong premises. Preferences, represented by utilities, beliefs represented by probabilities, common knowledge and symmetric rationality as background assumptions are treated as “given.” A richer language enabling us to capture the process leading to what is “given” seems superior to the stenography of decision making in terms of utility cum probability. However, similar to traditional rational choice modeling, boundedly rational choice modeling, as outlined here, is far from being a “global” theory with empirical content; rather it serves as a tool to formulate “local” theories with empirical content.

Keywords: bounded rationality; methodology of decision; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/1/1/53/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/1/1/53/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:1:p:53-65:d:7584

Access Statistics for this article

Games is currently edited by Ms. Susie Huang

More articles in Games from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().