Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism

Maria Levati and Ro'i Zultan

Games, 2011, vol. 2, issue 1, 1-15

Abstract: This paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. We define contribution cycles as the number of contributors a player waits for before committing to a further contribution, and use a permutation test on contribution cycles to assign a measure of conditional cooperation to each group play. The validity of the measures is tested in an experiment. We find that roughly 20% of the plays exhibit dynamics of conditional cooperation. Moreover, notwithstanding a decline in contributions, conditional cooperation is found to be stable over time.

Keywords: public goods game; real-time protocol; information feedback; conditional cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (2009)
Working Paper: Cycles of conditional cooperation in a real-time voluntary contribution mechanism (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:2:y:2011:i:1:p:1-15:d:10959

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