Framing and Feedback in Social Dilemmas with Partners and Strangers

Caleb Cox and Brock Stoddard

Games, 2015, vol. 6, issue 4, 1-19

Abstract: We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good, while in the Take-framed game, players take from an existing public good. The results show Take framing and Individual-level feedback lead to more extreme behavior (free-riding and full cooperation), especially for Partners. These results suggest Take framing and Individual-level feedback increase the variability of cooperation.

Keywords: public goods; experiment; framing; cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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