Community-Based Reasoning in Games: Salience, Rule-Following, and Counterfactuals

Cyril Hédoin

Games, 2016, vol. 7, issue 4, 1-17

Abstract: This paper develops a game-theoretic and epistemic account of a peculiar mode of practical reasoning that sustains focal points but also more general forms of rule-following behavior which I call community-based reasoning (CBR). It emphasizes the importance of counterfactuals in strategic interactions. In particular, the existence of rules does not reduce to observable behavioral patterns but also encompasses a range of counterfactual beliefs and behaviors. This feature was already at the core of Wittgenstein’s philosophical account of rule-following. On this basis, I consider the possibility that CBR may provide a rational basis for cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma.

Keywords: community-based reasoning; epistemic logic; game theory; rule-following; counterfactuals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/7/4/36/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/7/4/36/ (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Community-Based Reasoning in Games: Salience, Rule-Following, and Counterfactuals (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:7:y:2016:i:4:p:36-:d:82986

Access Statistics for this article

Games is currently edited by Ms. Susie Huang

More articles in Games from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().