Community-Based Reasoning in Games: Salience, Rule-Following, and Counterfactuals

Cyril Hédoin

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Abstract: This paper develops a game-theoretic and epistemic account of a peculiar mode of practical reasoning that sustains focal points but also more general forms of rule-following behavior which I call community-based reasoning (CBR). It emphasizes the importance of counterfactuals in strategic interactions. In particular, the existence of rules does not reduce to observable behavioral patterns but also encompasses a range of counterfactual beliefs and behaviors. This feature was already at the core of Wittgenstein's philosophical account of rule-following. On this basis, I consider the possibility that CBR may provide a rational basis for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma.

Keywords: community-based reasoning; epistemic logic; game theory; rule-following; counterfactuals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications, 2016, 7 (4), pp.36. ⟨10.3390/g7040036⟩

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Journal Article: Community-Based Reasoning in Games: Salience, Rule-Following, and Counterfactuals (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02865620

DOI: 10.3390/g7040036

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