Anticipated Communication in the Ultimatum Game

Mario Capizzani, Luigi Mittone, Andrew Musau and Antonino Vaccaro
Additional contact information
Mario Capizzani: IESE Business School, Av. Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, Spain
Antonino Vaccaro: IESE Business School, Av. Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, Spain

Games, 2017, vol. 8, issue 3, 1-20

Abstract: Anticipated verbal feedback in a dictator game has been shown to induce altruistic behavior. However, in the ultimatum game which, apart from generosity, entails a strategic component since a proposer may (rightly) fear that the responder will reject a low offer, it remains an open question whether anticipated verbal communication can be effective in increasing offers. We implement a between-subjects experimental design in the ultimatum game with strategy method manipulating the form of anticipated verbal communication (no communication, one-sided communication from proposers and two-sided communication) and find that offers are significantly higher in the presence of anticipated two-sided communication. However, anticipated one-sided communication from proposers has no effect on offers, suggesting, as found in previous studies, that it is the anticipation of feedback that is relevant.

Keywords: ultimatum game; anticipated communication; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Anticipated communication in the ultimatum game (2016)
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