Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game

Felix Albrecht and Sebastian Kube
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Felix Albrecht: Economics Department, University of Marburg, Universitätsstraße 25, D-35037 Marburg, Germany

Games, 2018, vol. 9, issue 3, 1-13

Abstract: We elicit individual-level peer-punishment types in a cooperation (social dilemma) and a coordination (weakest link) problem. In line with previous literature, we find heterogeneity in peer-punishment in both environments. Comparing punishment behavior across the two environments within subject , we observe a high degree of individuals’ punishment type stability . However, the aggregate punishment demand is higher in the weakest-link game. The difference between the two environments is driven by subjects whose behavioral types are inconsistent rather than by a change in the punishment demand of those who punish in both environments.

Keywords: peer punishment; strategy method; type classification; public goods game; coordination game; weakest link game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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