Physician Behavior under Prospective Payment Schemes—Evidence from Artefactual Field and Lab Experiments

Simon Reif, Lucas Hafner and Michael Seebauer
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Lucas Hafner: Department of Economics, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Findelgasse 7, 90402 Nürnberg, Germany
Michael Seebauer: Department of Economics, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Findelgasse 7, 90402 Nürnberg, Germany

IJERPH, 2020, vol. 17, issue 15, 1-37

Abstract: Recent experimental studies analyze the behavior of physicians towards patients and find that physicians care for their own profit as well as patient benefit. In this paper, we extend the experimental analysis of the physician decision problem by adding a third party which represents the health insurance that finances medical service provision under a prospective payment scheme. Our results show that physicians take into account the payoffs of the third party, which can lead to underprovision of medical care. We conduct a laboratory experiment in neutral as well as in medical framing using students and medical doctors as subjects. Subjects in the medically framed experiments behave weakly and are more patient orientated in contrast to neutral framing. A sample of medical doctors exhibits comparable behavior to students with medical framing.

Keywords: health economic experiment; framing; physician behavior; prospective payment schemes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Working Paper: Physician behavior under prospective payment schemes: Evidence from artefactual field and lab experiments (2017)
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