Physician behavior under prospective payment schemes: Evidence from artefactual field and lab experiments
Lucas Hafner,
Simon Reif and
Michael Seebauer
No 18/2017, FAU Discussion Papers in Economics from Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics
Abstract:
Recent experimental studies analyze the behavior of physicians towards patients and find that physicians care for their own profit as well as patient benefit. In this paper, we extend the experimental analysis of the physician decision problem by adding a third party representing the health insurance which finances medical service provision. Our results show that physicians take into account the payoffs of the third party, which can lead to underprovision of medical services. We conduct a laboratory experiment in neutral as well as medical framing using students and medical doctors as subjects. Subjects in the medically framed experiments behave weakly more patient orientated in contrast to neutral framing. A sample of medical doctors exhibits comparable behavior to students with medical framing.
Keywords: health economic experiment; framing; physician behavior; prospective payment schemes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C93 I11 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hea and nep-hrm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/171229/1/1002674433.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Physician Behavior under Prospective Payment Schemes—Evidence from Artefactual Field and Lab Experiments (2020) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:iwqwdp:182017
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