On the Dynamics and Stability of the Crime and Punishment Game

María J. Quinteros, Marcelo Villena and Abdellatif Ben Makhlouf

Complexity, 2022, vol. 2022, 1-14

Abstract: We study the dynamics and stability of the economics of crime and punishment game from an evolutionary perspective. Specifically, we model the interaction between agents and controllers as an asymmetric game exploring the dynamics of the classic static model using a replicator dynamics equation, given exogenous levels of monitoring and criminal sanctions. The dynamics show five possible equilibria, from which three are stable. Our results show that a culture of honest agents is never stable; however when the penalty is high enough, the system will neutrally tend to an equilibrium of honest agents and a monitoring firm. By contrast, when the probability of detecting wrongdoing is small, the system, in some cases, will remain in a transient state, in which it is impossible to predict the proportion of honest agents.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:complx:2449031

DOI: 10.1155/2022/2449031

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