Limiting Dynamics for Q-Learning with Memory One in Symmetric Two-Player, Two-Action Games

J. M. Meylahn, L. Janssen and Hassan Zargarzadeh

Complexity, 2022, vol. 2022, 1-20

Abstract: We develop a method based on computer algebra systems to represent the mutual pure strategy best-response dynamics of symmetric two-player, two-action repeated games played by players with a one-period memory. We apply this method to the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, stag hunt, and hawk-dove games and identify all possible equilibrium strategy pairs and the conditions for their existence. The only equilibrium strategy pair that is possible in all three games is the win-stay, lose-shift strategy. Lastly, we show that the mutual best-response dynamics are realized by a sample batch Q-learning algorithm in the infinite batch size limit.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:complx:4830491

DOI: 10.1155/2022/4830491

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