An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Analysis to Conflicts among Stakeholders Involved in the Operation of Municipal Waste Incineration

Yang Yu, Rui Zhao, Yuxin Huang and Linchuan Yang

Complexity, 2020, vol. 2020, 1-16

Abstract:

This study presents an evolutionary game to model interactions among stakeholders with potential conflicts, including the operational enterprise of incineration plant, the local government, and the residents nearby. System dynamics is used to simulate the change of strategic actions corresponding to the three players, in order to seek for the evolutionary stability strategies. A numerical case is proposed to demonstrate the game theory application, in which the impacts of governmental incentive and punishment on the player’s actions are investigated. The results indicated that administrative penalty is effective not only in motivating the enterprises to upgrade treatment facilities for ensuring environmental quality but also in helping the local government and residents to approach dominant strategies. Policy implications are given based on the results to lay out a foundation for the alleviation of the conflicts.

Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:complx:8825284

DOI: 10.1155/2020/8825284

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