An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China

Hongsen Luo, Ying Gao, Fulei Shi and Ana Me Trovi

Complexity, 2021, vol. 2021, 1-11

Abstract: Public information is a social resource that connects all aspects of social life, regulates social activities and public behaviors, and plays a very important role in influencing public trust. Based on the perspective of communication, we divide the government into two ways to release public information, that is, mass communication and personalized recommendation. Moreover, the public can choose to acquire or not acquire a strategy. Then, this study conducts an evolutionary game between the government and the public to analyze the influence of public information on the public in China. Our objective is to find how the evolutionary path changes between the two players when strategies are changing. Then, a simulation analysis is presented in six scenarios to illustrate the results. The results show that the two players can converge to different stable statuses under different situations.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:complx:8956704

DOI: 10.1155/2021/8956704

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