Evolution of Equity Norms in Small-World Networks

José I. Santos, David J. Poza, José M. Galán and Adolfo López-Paredes
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jose Manuel Galan

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2012, vol. 2012, 1-18

Abstract:

The topology of interactions has been proved very influential in the results of models based on learning and evolutionary game theory. This paper is aimed at investigating the effect of structures ranging from regular ring lattices to random networks, including small-world networks, in a model focused on property distribution norms. The model considers a fixed and finite population of agents who play the Nash bargaining game repeatedly. Our results show that regular networks promote the emergence of the equity norm, while less-structured networks make possible the appearance of fractious regimes. Additionally, our analysis reveals that the speed of adoption can also be affected by the network structure.

Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/DDNS/2012/482481.pdf (application/pdf)
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/DDNS/2012/482481.xml (text/xml)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnddns:482481

DOI: 10.1155/2012/482481

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society from Hindawi
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mohamed Abdelhakeem ().