Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games: The Case of EU Procedures

Annick Laruelle () and Mika WidgrÚn
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Mika WidgrÚn: Turku School of Economics and Business Administration, Finnland
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Mika Tapani Widgrén

Homo Oeconomicus, 2000, vol. 17, 67-84

Abstract: Probabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to assess actors' influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative voting game and uses the EU as an example. By a subsequent specialization of power indices we are able to quantify, for instance, to what extent the development of the decision-making procedures on the EU has changed the division of power among its main organs.

Date: 2000
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Working Paper: Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games: The Case of EU Procedures (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:17:y:2000:p:67-84

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