Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games: The Case of EU Procedures

Annick Laruelle () and Mika Widgren
Additional contact information
Mika Widgren: Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation, Helsinki; CEPR

No 1998001, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: Probabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to access actors‚ influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative voting game and uses the EU as an example. By a subsequent specialization of power indices we are able to quantify, for instance, to what extent the development of the decision-making procedures on the EU has changed the division of power among its main organs.

JEL-codes: C71 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16
Date: 1998-01-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games: The Case of EU Procedures (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:1998001

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