Why do people veto? An experimental analysis of the evaluation and the consequences of varying degrees of veto power

Werner G³th and Judit Kovßcs
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Werner G³th: Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Unit, Jena, Germany
Judit Kovßcs: Institute pf Phycholoy, University of Debrecen, Debrecen, Hungary
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Werner Güth ()

Homo Oeconomicus, 2001, vol. 18, 277-302

Abstract: By vetoing one question mutually efficient agreements. On the other hand, the threat of vetoing may prevent exploitation. Based on a generalization of ultimatum bargaining (Suleiman, 1996), we first elicit the responders' certainty equivalents for three different degrees of veto power. Afterwards the corresponding bargaining rule is implemented. The experimental data reveal that proposers are afraid of more veto power, and that responders only care about commanding veto power but not its degree.

Date: 2001
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Working Paper: Why do People Veto? An Experimental Analysis of the Valuation and the Consequences of Varying Degrees of Veto Power (2000)
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