How Paulus Becomes Saulus An Experimental Study of Equal Punishment Games

Marlies Ahlert, Arwed Cr³ger and Werner G³th
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Marlies Ahlert: Martin-Luther-University of Halle-Wittenberg, Department of Economics, Institute for Financial Science, Halle/Saale, Germany
Arwed Cr³ger: Martin-Luther-University of Halle-Wittenberg, Department of Economics, Institute for Financial Science, Halle/Saale, Germany
Werner G³th: Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Unit, Jena, Germany
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Werner Güth ()

Homo Oeconomicus, 2001, vol. 18, 303-318

Abstract: In equal punishment games like in ultimatum games first a proposer suggests how to split the pie, i.e. a positive monetary reward. Unlike in ultimatum games, the responder can decide among many (for proposer and responder) equal penalty payments. To exclude negative payoffs, punishment was bounded from above by the sum of the offer and the (for proposer and responder) same show up-fee, our only treatment variable. Although inequality aversion predicts zero-punishments, we observe positive punishments which however, decrease with experience, Initial fairness, 1/3 of initial offers were equal splits, is often substituted in the repetition by greed. Whereas greed is sticky, fairness seems to be an initial inclination but unstable.

Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:18:y:2001:p:303-318

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