How Ultimatum Offers Emerge: A Study in Bounded Rationality

Werner G³th
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Werner G³th: Humboldt-University of Berlin, Department of Economics, Institute for Economic Theory III, Berlin, Germany
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Werner Güth ()

Homo Oeconomicus, 2001, vol. 18, 91-110

Abstract: The general framework of decision emergence (G³th, 200a) is applied to the specific decision task of a proposer in ultimatum bargaining, i.e. to choosing how much the responder should be offered. For this purpose the "Master Module" as well as its submodules "New Problem Solver", "Adaption Procedure" and "Learning" have to be specified for the task at hand. This illustrates the applicability of the general framework of boundedly rational decision emerge.

Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:18:y:2001:p:91-110

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