Qualified Majority Voting Explained

Dan S. Felsenthal () and Moshé Machover
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Dan S. Felsenthal: University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel

Homo Oeconomicus, 2004, vol. 21, 573-576

Abstract: We explain the issue of the decision rule of the EUÆs Council of Ministers. We outline, in as non-technical fashion as we can, the mathematical theory (due to L S Penrose) that addresses this sort of issue. We assess the decision rule prescribed in the Nice Treaty as well as that included in the Draft Constitution proposed by the European Convention. Finally, we propose our own solution to this problem.

Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:21:y:2004:p:573-576

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