Qualified majority voting explained

Dan S. Felsenthal and Moshé Machover

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We explain the issue of the decision rule of the EU's Council of Ministers. We outline, in as non-technical fashion as we can, the mathematical theory (due to L S Penrose) that addresses this sort of issue. We assess the decision rule prescribed in the Nice Treaty as well as that included in the Draft Constitution proposed by the European Convention. Finally, we propose our own solution to this problem.

Keywords: EU Council of Ministers; EU Constitution; qualified majority voting; voting power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C43 C71 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-12
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Published in Homo Oeconomicus, December, 2004, 21(3/4), pp. 573-595. ISSN: 0943-0180

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24230/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Qualified Majority Voting Explained (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:24230

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