The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities
Santiago Urbiztondo () and
Bertrand Quelin ()
International Journal of Management and Network Economics, 2009, vol. 1, issue 2, 232-256
To what extent should public utilities regulation be expected to converge across countries? When it occurs, will it generate good outcomes? Building on the core proposition of the New Institutional Economics that similar regulations generate different outcomes depending on their fit with the underlying domestic institutions, we develop a simple model and explore its implications by examining the diffusion of local loop unbundling (LLU) regulations. We argue that: one should expect some convergence in public utility regulation but with still a significant degree of local experimentation; this process will have very different impacts of regulation.
Keywords: regulatory convergence; telecommunications; unbundling regulations; political economy; public utilities; public utility regulation; regulation impacts; local impact. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities (2009)
Working Paper: The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijmnec:v:1:y:2009:i:2:p:232-256
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