Economics at your fingertips  

Asymmetric equilibria and non-cooperative access pricing in telecommunications

Stefan Behringer

International Journal of Management and Network Economics, 2012, vol. 2, issue 3, 257-281

Abstract: This paper looks at competition in the telecommunications industry with non-linear tariffs and network-based price discrimination. Allowing for asymmetric networks and non-cooperatively chosen access prices simultaneously allows to explicitly derive non-reciprocal equilibrium access price choices that are above the efficient level and thus reconcile theory with regulatory practice.

Keywords: asymmetric networks; telecommunications industry; competition policy; access pricing; regulation; non-cooperative pricing; nonlinear tariffs; price discrimination; regulatory practice. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-Cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Journal of Management and Network Economics from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sarah Parker ().

Page updated 2022-08-17
Handle: RePEc:ids:ijmnec:v:2:y:2012:i:3:p:257-281