Asymmetric equilibria and non-cooperative access pricing in telecommunications

Stefan Behringer

International Journal of Management and Network Economics, 2012, vol. 2, issue 3, 257-281

Abstract: This paper looks at competition in the telecommunications industry with non-linear tariffs and network-based price discrimination. Allowing for asymmetric networks and non-cooperatively chosen access prices simultaneously allows to explicitly derive non-reciprocal equilibrium access price choices that are above the efficient level and thus reconcile theory with regulatory practice.

Keywords: asymmetric networks; telecommunications industry; competition policy; access pricing; regulation; non-cooperative pricing; nonlinear tariffs; price discrimination; regulatory practice. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=48514 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-Cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications (2008)
Working Paper: Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijmnec:v:2:y:2012:i:3:p:257-281

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Journal of Management and Network Economics from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sarah Parker ().