Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-Cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications

Stefan Behringer

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper looks at competition in the Telecommunications industry with non-linear tariffs and network based price discrimination. Allowing for asymmetric networks and non-cooperatively chosen access prices simultaneously allows to explicitly derive non-reciprocal equilibrium access price choices that are above the efficient level.

Keywords: Asymmetric Networks; Access Pricing; Interconnection; Competition Policy; Telecommunications (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 K21 L41 L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-11-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ict, nep-law, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11795/1/MPRA_paper_11795.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Asymmetric equilibria and non-cooperative access pricing in telecommunications (2012)
Working Paper: Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:11795

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