A discrimination matching model for academic recruitment

Luigi Bonaventura

International Journal of Pluralism and Economics Education, 2014, vol. 5, issue 2, 133-143

Abstract: In a matching model of the academic labour market, with outside and inside workers, this paper shows that outsiders are harmed by the insiders. This is due on two types of search frictions: information and cooptation. Each frictions reduce the probability to get an academic job for outsiders compared to insiders. A high level of cooptation discards the outsiders but, under certain conditions, the absence of cooptation does not decrease the possibility to get an academic job for insiders. Within this framework, some explanations about the low probability to retain the best, and the obstacles for an effective equal opportunity between insider and outsider candidates are discussed.

Keywords: academic labour market; search frictions; information; cooptation; recruitment systems; academic recruitment; discrimination; matching models; pluralism; meritocracy; outsiders; insiders; academic jobs; higher education; equal opportunities; insider candidates; outsider candidates. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=63508 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijplur:v:5:y:2014:i:2:p:133-143

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Journal of Pluralism and Economics Education from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sarah Parker ().