 Bundling and International Market SegmentationHenrik Horn and Oz Shy International Economic Review, 1996, vol. 37, issue 1, 51-69 Abstract: This paper shows how firms, by bundling their products with nontradables, may contribute to the segmentation of international oligopoly markets. The authors develop a simple example with two products: one that is homogeneous across markets and one that is bundled with a nontradable, e.g., local services. Integration of the markets for the homogeneous product yields the expected price equalization across markets. However, integration of the markets for bundled products leaves the economy entirely unaffected. Hence, the standard methodology of comparing a 'segmented' and an 'integrated' equilibrium would exaggerate the effects of integration in this economy. Copyright 1996 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association. Date: 1996 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:37:y:1996:i:1:p:51-69 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article International Economic Review is currently edited by Harold L. Cole More articles in International Economic Review from Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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