Unobserved Delegation

Chaim Fershtman () and Ehud Kalai

International Economic Review, 1997, vol. 38, issue 4, 763-74

Abstract: This paper describes situations where commitment via delegation is beneficial, even when the delegation is unobservable and the players have the option to play the game themselves. The potential for such benefits depends on the type of delegation, incentive versus instructive, the possibility of repetition, and the probability of observability. Copyright 1997 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Date: 1997
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Working Paper: Unobserved Delegation (1993)
Working Paper: Unobserved Delegation (1993)
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