Unobserved Delegation
Chaim Fershtman () and
Ehud Kalai
No 1043, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Abstract:
The paper describes situations where commitment via delegation is beneficial, even when the delegation is unobservable and the players have the option to play the game themselves. The potentiual for such benefits depends on the type of delegation, incentive versus instructive, the possibility of repetition, and the probability of observability.
Date: 1993-04
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Related works:
Journal Article: Unobserved Delegation (1997)
Working Paper: Unobserved Delegation (1993)
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