Gender Differences in Education in a Dynamic Household Bargaining Model
E. Echevarria and
Antonio Merlo ()
International Economic Review, 1999, vol. 40, issue 2, 265-86
We explore the issue of gender differences in education in the context of a two-sex overlapping generations model where men and women of each generation bargain over consumption, number of children, and investment in education of their children. We show that the gender difference implied by our model is smaller than the one that would result from a pure investment model. We use our model to estimate the cost to a woman of having a child. The estimate we obtain is about 5% of the working lifetime of a woman. Copyright 1999 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Working Paper: Gender differences in education in a dynamic household bargaining model (1997)
Working Paper: Gender differences in education in a dynamic household bargaining model (1995)
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