Gender differences in education in a dynamic household bargaining model
E. Echevarria and
Antonio Merlo ()
No 195, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
We interpret observed gender differences in education as the equilibrium outcome of a two-sex overlapping generations model where men and women of each generation bargain over consumption, number of children, and investment in education of their children conditional on gender. This model represents a new framework for the analysis of the process of intrahousehold decision making in an intergenerational setting.
Keywords: Education (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Gender Differences in Education in a Dynamic Household Bargaining Model (1999)
Working Paper: Gender differences in education in a dynamic household bargaining model (1997)
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