Gender differences in education in a dynamic household bargaining model

E. Echevarria and Antonio Merlo

No 195, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: We interpret observed gender differences in education as the equilibrium outcome of a two-sex overlapping generations model where men and women of each generation bargain over consumption, number of children, and investment in education of their children conditional on gender. This model represents a new framework for the analysis of the process of intrahousehold decision making in an intergenerational setting.

Keywords: Education (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Gender Differences in Education in a Dynamic Household Bargaining Model (1999)
Working Paper: Gender differences in education in a dynamic household bargaining model (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedmsr:195

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