A Theory of Trade Secrets in Firms

J·n Z·bojnÌk
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J·n Z·bojnÌk: University of Southern California, USA
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jan Zabojnik

International Economic Review, 2002, vol. 43, issue 3, 831-855

Abstract: This article provides a simple theoretical model of trade secrets in hierarchical firms. A crucial assumption is that each manager has access to trade secrets pertaining to his own hierarchical level as well as to all lower levels. The article explores some implications of this assumption for optimal degree of trade secrets accumulation and protection as well as for the wage structure in firms. In addition, the model implies that managers may have an incentive to overpay their subordinates and protect their firms' trade secrets too much. Copyright Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association

Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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